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Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian 
incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their 
properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to 
transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between 
ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of 
point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and 
adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have 
to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate 
pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return 
regulation with a “used and useful” criterion.    
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1. Introduction  
Performance-based regulation (PBR or incentive regulation) is characterized by two main 
properties. First, it gives the regulated firm some behavioral discretion, for example, in 
the choice of prices. Second, it rewards (punishes) the firm for improving (deteriorating) 
performance relative to the regulator’s objectives. In addition, it is often more compatible 
with the opening of regulated markets to competition than traditional cost-of-service (or 
rate-of-return) regulation. The current literature on PBR developed from two very 
different needs.  
 
The first need was to improve the perceived theoretical and practical inadequacies of U.S. 
rate-of-return regulation. This part of the literature had its roots in the discovery of the 
Averch-Johnson effect, according to which rate-of-return regulation deviates from cost 
minimization (Averch and Johnson, 1962). But it began in earnest only with Baumol’s 
“plausible policies for an imperfect world” (Baumol, 1967), leading to new developments 
such as price caps and yardstick regulation. This literature had a substantial impact on the 
regulation of network industries worldwide and particularly on telecommunications. PBR 
is also common in U.S. telecommunications but not as much in electricity. This lack of 
PBR for the electricity sector may be due to lumpy and long-term investments, which are 
hard to handle with incentive schemes of shorter duration, or due to the prevalence of 
                                                 
1 This paper was originally written for the Carnegie-Mellon Conference on “Electricity Transmission in 
Deregulated Markets” on December 15/16, 2004. The author’s research on this project was supported by 
NSF Grant ECS-0323620 to Carnegie-Mellon University on "EPNES: Dynamic Transmission Provision 
and Pricing for Electric Power Systems."   
  1cost increases (rather than declining costs) over time, which makes incentive regulation 
look unattractive. 
 
The second need came from the theoretical literature on optimal pricing for public 
enterprises and regulated industries that had been developed by Hotelling (1938) and 
Boiteux (1956). This literature had come up with marginal cost pricing and Ramsey 
pricing rules but had neglected the lack of information of regulators to implement such 
rules in light of the informational superiority of the regulated firms. During the 1970s the 
principal-agent framework had been developed to deal with similar problems of 
asymmetric information in the context of managerial incentives under separation of 
ownership and control. The merger of the principal-agent approach and the optimal 
pricing literature then lead to the Bayesian approach to incentive regulation by Baron and 
Myerson (1982), Sappington (1983) and Laffont and Tirole (1986). This literature has 
grown substantially over time but has had very little concrete and visible impact on the 
way regulation has been done. One reason for this is the difficulty to translate the 
approach into rules that regulators can apply directly. Another reason may be that some 
of the potential learning from this approach is not viable in the actual regulatory 
environment (Crew and Kleindorfer, 2002). 
 
While this short characterization of the two approaches would suggest that electricity 
transmission pricing be best served by the practical approach of plausible rules, we will 
argue below that both approaches are needed to deal with transmission pricing problems. 
 
Electricity transmission pricing is a complicated task. The lack of storability of 
electricity, in combination with transmission capacity constraints, suggests that pricing in 
the very short run is important in order to avoid congestion. At the same time prices have 
to guide operating and investment decisions by transmission companies, generators and 
load-serving entities (distribution companies). This suggests pricing approaches geared at 
highly differentiated time horizons. Furthermore, transmission cost functions are affected 
by loop flow problems (Kirchhoff’s law), power losses and ancillary services.          
 
2. Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian incentive schemes  
2.1 Bayesian incentive schemes 
2.1.1 Characterization 
Under the Bayesian incentive approach the regulator is viewed as a principal who uses 
the regulated firm as an agent in order to fulfill the principal’s objective, which is well-
defined and expressed in monetary terms. A typical regulatory objective would be to 
maximize W(p) = V(p) + απ(p), where W(p) represents welfare as a function of the 
firm’s price, V(p) is consumer surplus, α is a weight between 0 and 1, and π(p) is the 
firm’s profit. The tool is usually a monetary transfer T(p) from the regulator with which 
the firm is induced to act in the principal’s interest. Since the transfer occurs between the 
regulator and the firm, it affects the regulator’s objective function not only through the 
behavioral effect on the firm but also directly. Here the assumption is that the effect on 
  2the firm’s profit is weighted by α ≤ 1, while the effect on the regulator’s budget is 
weighted by 1.  
 
Information is asymmetric in that the agent has important knowledge about herself or 
about the situation that the principal does not have. Items that matter for performance, 
such as the firm’s effort to reduce costs, are framed in terms of asymmetric information. 
If the regulator could costlessly observe such effort he would hold the firm to the optimal 
effort level directly. This asymmetry of information is captured by the assumption that 
the principal has probabilistic information about the agent (knows the distribution of 
types that the agent belongs to), while the agent knows her actual type. The principal and 
agent are further assumed to be fully informed about all the other relevant properties 
(functional forms, etc.) necessary to fulfill the principal’s objective.  
 
Since the agent acts in her own interest by maximizing Π(T(p), p) = π(p) + T(p), 
principal and agent play a game against each other. One specific feature of the principal-
agent game is that the principal usually moves first by setting the incentive scheme for 
the agent. In a single-period setting the principal therefore solves the game backwards by 
taking into consideration the agent’s response to the principal’s incentive scheme. This 
response is captured by two constraints on the principal’s optimization problem. The first 
is that the agent will only be willing to act on the principal’s behalf if she is rewarded at 




The second constraint is that the agent is going to maximize her own utility under the 
incentives provided by the principal. Since these incentives depend on the actual type of 
the agent they have to be designed in such a way that the agent is induced not to mimic 
someone else’s type (incentive compatibility constraint = ICC).  
 
In the case where the regulated firm’s type (θ) and effort (e) cannot be observed and 
where the unobservable cost of effort to the firm is ψ(e) the maximization problem for 
the regulator is to find an incentive scheme T(p) with   
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2 Since the principal is maximizing his expected objective over the distribution of the agents types, it is not 
clear that the participation contraint is required in its usual form. It makes the principal totally risk averse 
against the possibility of not attracting any agent. Such total risk aversion may be a reasonable assumption. 
However, it could well be that the principal prefers the chance of higher realization of his objectives for 
more efficient types of agents going along with a small risk of zero fulfillment of his objective for the less 
efficient types over some objective fulfillment for all types. As already shown by Baron and Myerson 
(1982), the results of this alternative approach would not change much of the current literature provided the 
difference between fulfillment of the principal’s objective by the least efficient agents and excluding these 
agents altogether is sufficiently large. 
  3The ICC results from the observation that a more efficient type θ
+ can mimic a less 
efficient type θ
- simply by exerting less effort and still making the same profit and getting 
the same transfer. As a result, mimicking type θ
- would give type θ
+ an extra profit from 
the reduced cost of effort.  
 
The incentive schemes designed under this approach are called Bayesian because the 
probability distribution of types used by the regulator is subjective with density f(θ) and 
cumulative distribution function F(θ) and is updated (in a multi-period problem) 
according to Bayesian rules of probability updating. The prior probabilities are simply 
assumed as given.  
 
Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) severely criticize (a) that the approach spends no 
intellectual effort on the derivation of the probability distribution F(θ) and (b) that F(θ) is 
assumed to be common knowledge. Both these criticisms are severe. However, some 
strands of the Bayesian literature deal with regulatory monitoring that can be interpreted 
as the gathering of information about agents’ types and thereby dealing with the first 
criticism (Baron and Besanko, 1984). Nevertheless, Crew and Kleindorfer are right that 
no part of the Bayesian literature reflects the actual information-gathering process of 
regulatory procedures. The second criticism may be countered by the argument that the 
regulated firm does not have to have the same information about the distribution as the 
regulator as long as she knows her own type.
3 However, even if no common knowledge 
assumption is required the assumption of subjective priors means that the scheme cannot 
be monitored by the general public that employs the regulator (Vogelsang, 1988). Crew 
and Kleindorfer are therefore right that the use of the principal-agent framework is 
suspect because the regulator lacks the sovereignty of a real principal. The answer 
already anticipated by the Bayesian incentive literature has been to complicate the model 
by treating regulators simultaneously as principals and agents in a two-stage principal-
agent framework, where regulators are employed by the general public and themselves 
employ the regulated firm (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, chapters 11 and 15). 
 
A further criticism of the Bayesian approach is its use of transfers to the firm as the main 
tool for influencing the regulated firm’s behavior.
4 Normally, regulators do not have the 
authority to pay transfers to firms. Nor can they tax firms if the transfers turn out to be 
negative (which they often are in the optimum).
5 The transfer issue, however, can often 
be solved by making consumers pay fixed fees equal to these transfers.
6 As long as the 
fixed fees do not exclude consumers, their allocative effects are negligible (depending on 
income effects or the like). But if they are charged in conjunction with and in addition to 
other fixed fees that is not always a safe assumption.  
 
                                                 
3 The Bayesian approach normally assumes that the regulator has full information about most of the firm’s 
problem, e.g., about the functional forms of demands and costs. 
4 This is not a problem in the other application of this literature which is for government procurement. 
5 For example, under the original Baron-Myerson mechanism the least efficient firm type charges a price 
above costs but is just breaking even, due to a transfer to the regulator (Baron and Myerson, 1982). 
6 However, if transfers are negative (tax) those would result in negative fixed fees, which – in turn – could 
induce consumers to behave opportunistically, in order to reap such negative fees. 
  4The more realism is included in the regulatory problem under the Bayesian approach the 
less feasible it becomes to derive directly applicable quantitative regulatory rules. Rather, 
the results of the Bayesian approach only lend themselves to general qualitative 
prescriptions that have to be filled out by the legislature and by concrete regulators. In my 
view, this is best done in combination with the simple rules derived under the non-
Bayesian approach. The results from the Bayesian literature could determine the design 
of non-Bayesian mechanisms and the choice among several non-Bayesian mechanisms.       
 
2.1.2 Main results and insights 
What are the qualitative insights of the Bayesian approach? 
 
(1) The full information optimum is generally not achievable. The claimed exception is 
the absence of distributional concerns (α = 1) and of any costs of raising public funds for 
transfers. The example for that is the Loeb-Magat mechanism (Loeb and Magat, 1979), 
which, however, additionally requires full information of the regulator about the demand 
function. Regulation is always imperfect. So is incentive regulation. The question is 
therefore primarily if it is an improvement compared to traditional cost-of-service 
regulation. 
 
(2) The quality of Bayesian regulation depends crucially on the ability and intentions of 
the actual regulator. This requires that the application the regulation schemes be based on 
mutually observable data, meaning that incentives have to be compatible with regulatory 
accounting. The better the hard information of the regulator the better the goal 
achievement and the lower will generally the information rents be that have to be granted 
to the firm. 
 
(3) The most important insight is that superior efficiency by the firm (for revealing 
information and for superior effort) should be rewarded by increased profits. The profit or 
information rent should increase in the innate efficiency of the regulated firm (its type). 
This is the direct result of the PC and the ICC. The participation constraint requires that 
any type of firm earn nonnegative profits. Because any more efficient firm type can 
always mimic the most inefficient type, the incentive compatibility constraint then 
assures that any but the most inefficient type will earn positive profits. This also means 
that, from the regulator’s perspective, expected profits (with expectations over the θ’s) 
are positive. Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) severely criticize this feature of Bayesian 
schemes, claiming that such positive profits would be politically unrealistic. Also, 
Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) hold that the firm should be able to make positive 
profits under some circumstances, but negative profits under others, with at least cost 
coverage over time. While this recommendation appears to be contrary to most of the 
Bayesian incentive literature, it hinges on the interpretation of the participation 
constraint.
7 It may be that zero economic profits do not represent the reservation utility of 
                                                 
7 Because of the exercise of discretion under PBR the regulated firm’s risk is usually increased. This can 
lead to losses from time to time and those would have to be compensated by the chance of making higher 
profits. Further the firm’s cost of capital may increase as a result of PBR, lowering expected economic 
profits.  
  5the firm. The reservation profit could, for example, be negative after entry and in the 
presence of sunk costs. The longer the time horizon, the closer the reservation utility will 
be to zero profits. It also is worth noting that almost all of the literature on the Averch-
Johnson effect assumes that allowed profits under rate-of-return regulation exceed the 
cost of capital to the firm. This claim is theoretically backed by Evans and Garber (1988), 
while it is called into question by Joskow and MacAvoy (1975).   
 
(4) The higher the perceived innate efficiency of the firm (the more efficient a firm’s 
type) the more cost-reducing effort should it be induced to exert. This again follows from 
the ICC, because the more efficient types can mimic the less efficient types by exerting 
less effort. Since excessive profits are disliked by the regulator (rent extraction), the 
regulator is only willing to trade off such profits against productive efficiency. Combined 
with the incentive compatibility requirement this means that the firm is best offered a 
menu of regulatory options that lead to a self selection among firm types and 
accompanying effort levels.
8 The menu would be such that the lower cost types would 
choose the higher-powered incentive (for example, a price cap), while the higher cost 
types would choose the lower-powered incentives (for example, profit sharing or rate-of-
return regulation). 
 
While the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has tried out price regulation 
with menus for the Bell operating companies in the early 1990s, this practice was 
abandoned after a few years. I am not aware of any serious discussion of the menu 
approach in practice and will therefore not discuss it further here.  
 
(5) The Bayesian literature provides few insights about pricing. The strongest appears to 
be the incentive-pricing dichotomy (Laffont and Tirole, 1993), according to which (under 
some plausible conditions) pricing can be done optimally independent of the incentives 
for cost reduction. This result, however, is only valuable if the regulator can implement 
optimal prices based on revealed costs.  
 
There are no sharp results on pricing with unknown demand. When the optimal full 
information price is unequal marginal costs no general policy under asymmetric 
information about demand (and costs) can be formulated (Armstrong and Sappington, 
2003). This lack of direction provided by this literature would be relevant under 
economies of scale and if no Coase tariff were feasible.
9  
 
The results on pricing suggest that the non-Bayesian approaches receive little guidance 
from the Bayesian literature on pricing for allocative efficiency except that there exist no 
general reasons against aiming for allocatively optimal prices.    
   
(6) The ability of incentive regulation to achieve the regulatory objective depends on the 
number of instruments available relative to the number of objectives. Thus, price 
                                                 
8 The distribution of types may actually be altered by the introduction of incentive schemes because more 
incentive-oriented managers would be attracted to regulated firms. 
9 A Coase tariff is a two-part tariff that has a variable fee equal to marginal costs and a fixed fee that covers 
total costs so that welfare is maximized.  
  6regulation combined with a tax/subsidy scheme can better achieve allocative and 
productive efficiency that pricing alone. Two-part tariffs can achieve more than linear 
tariffs, in particular if the fixed fee has no allocative effects on consumers. 
 
Because quality improvements are costly, incentives for cost reductions and quality 
concerns can be in conflict. If price setting is the only policy instrument for both 
objectives cost-cutting incentives may have to be reduced if quality concerns are high. 
Preferable, however, is the application of specific quality-oriented instruments. Because 
we consider price regulation only, we will therefore leave out quality aspects from 
explicit consideration, assuming that quality optimization will be pursued with a separate 
instrument. 
  
(7) Commitment of the regulator emerges as an important driver of the power or 
steepness of incentives provided optimally. The power or steepness of incentives is the 
degree to which the firm’s revenues under the mechanism are independent of costs. The 
less revenues depend on cost the steeper or more high-powered the mechanism. 
Credibility of commitment has to be traded off against steepness of incentives. 
Commitment mostly refers to future periods. Thus, if commitment is restricted to the first 
period then this only allows for steep incentives if the activity (and/or the relevant firm 
type) only lasts for that period. If, however, the activity or validity of type information 
extends beyond that period less steep incentives are optimal. Joskow and Schmalensee 
(1986) therefore recommend against extending incentive regulation to long-run 
investment decisions. The less regulatory commitment, the flatter are the optimal 
incentives. As a result, rate-of-return regulation does not look so bad after all. It may just 
be an imperfect way to achieve optimality for long-run investments under a variety of 
realistic constraints.  
 
Further specific findings on commitment are:    
(7a) Under full commitment the regulator does not use its learning to update the policy 
within the time of commitment.  
(7b) Renegotiation (commitment of the regulator that the firm can maintain its rent) is 
generally not optimal.  
(7c) Under an inability to commit, less information by the regulator may be better than 
more information. It is hard to see how such an advice can be purposely implemented. 
(7d) Commitment is also bad if regulators are myopic, because they then may impose 
costs on society in the future (Lewis and Sappington, 1990). For example, the regulator 
could provide short-term incentives to reduce costs by deferring maintenance and thereby 
increase costs later. 
 
(8) The results in (7) suggest that increasing regulatory commitment would be desirable. 
However, restrictions on regulatory commitment are often deliberate in order to hold 
regulators accountable and reduce regulatory capture. Regulatory capture leads to a 
divergence between the regulator’s and society’s objective: Under capture regulatory 
commitment may therefore be bad, because then the result of capture cannot be undone. 
The danger of capture can therefore be one of the legitimate reasons for limits on 
  7regulatory commitment. It also explains restrictions on the regulatory tools, for example, 
the inability to use taxes and subsidies.   
 
(9) Outcomes should be tied to variables that are under managerial control as opposed to 
variation of outside variables (unless the two cannot be separated and regulators are risk 
neutral).  
 
(10) Last, the results of the Bayesian literature vary substantially  by the assumed 
circumstances. “The fact that information, technology, instruments, and institutions all 
matter in the design of regulatory policy implies that the best regulatory policy typically 
will vary across industries, across countries, and over time.” (Armstrong and Sappington, 
2003) 
 
2.2 Non-Bayesian incentive schemes 
In our discussion of non-Bayesian incentive regulation we leave out a number of 
suggested and practiced approaches, such as franchise bidding, yardstick regulation and 
double sourcing. We also do not consider substitutes for electricity transmission in the 
form of distributed generation. Reliability and other quality aspects are assumed given. 
 
Non-Bayesian approaches are based on the assumption that the regulated firm has 
superior information (about costs and/or demands) to the regulator and that this 
superiority can be converted into additional surplus by giving the firms behavioral 
discretion to use this information in a way that improves performance under the 
regulator’s objectives. This presupposes that the mechanism achieves some alignment of 
the firm’s objective (in profits) and the regulator’s objectives. The approaches are 
therefore linked to variables that are closely related to social surplus, the perceived 
regulatory objective function of this literature. Accordingly, firms can receive either the 
whole social surplus (Loeb-Magat, 1979), a transitional gain of the whole surplus 
increase (Sappington and Sibley, 1988) or of part of the surplus increase (Vogelsang and 
Finsinger, 1979).  
 
Under the Loeb-Magat scheme (1979) the firm receives the consumer surplus as a 
subsidy and therefore maximizes the regulatory objective directly (provided there are no 
distributional weights). Since distributional weights have to be assumed for reasons of 
fairness and since subsidies have to be ruled out and since consumer surplus cannot be 
observed with any degree of accuracy, other mechanisms have played a bigger role as 
suggestions for actual applications.  
 
The closest to the Loeb-Magat scheme is the incremental surplus subsidy scheme (ISS) 
by Sappington and Sibley (1988). The ISS belongs to the class of dynamic schemes with 
more direct potential application. According to the ISS the firm would receive a subsidy 
in each period (or pay a tax) equal to the difference between the consumer surplus 






Sappington and Sibley show that this mechanism converges to welfare-optimal prices 
(assuming equal weights) in a single period. Thus, the outcome is virtually always 
efficient. Three potential drawbacks are (1) that consumer surplus change needs to be 
observed by the regulator, (2) that the firm may earn rents in the first period and (3) that 
the regulator needs to be able to subsidize or tax the firm. The last of these drawbacks 
could be eliminated by the introduction of a fixed fee that lets consumers rather than the 
regulator “subsidize” the firm.
11 Provided no consumers exit the market because of the 
fixed fee, the incentive properties would be maintained. The second property is likely to 
be part of any incentive mechanism and therefore only of special concern if the rent 
becomes large. The first drawback could be overcome by observable approximations to 
the consumer surplus change. The simplest such approximation (the Slutsky 
approximation) is used in Finsinger and Vogelsang (1982), which is otherwise similar to 





t-1). This process leads 
to a convergence to welfare-optimal pricing in a stationary environment in the long run. 
Because the environment is likely to change over time, this delayed convergence is an 
undesirable property which could worsen through strategic behavior by the firm. A closer 
approximation to the consumer surplus change would therefore be desirable. Vogelsang 
(1988) shows that closer approximations are likely to be subject to strategic 
manipulations (cyclical behavior) by the firm. However, this disturbing outcome only 
holds if demand is nonlinear and if investments can be undone. Since transmission 
investments are largely sunk and since demands are often linear in the relevant price 
range, a simple observable second order approximation to the consumer surplus change 
may be the way to go. 
 
The ISS, based on two-part tariffs, could be interpreted in the tradition of the price-cap 
approach. Under price caps there are no subsidies and the regulated firm is allowed to 
charge prices only that obey a price-cap formula. This formula is usually supposed to 
provide incentives for cost minimization, investments and allocative efficiency, while 
keeping the firm’s rents at reasonable levels. The first mechanism trying to achieve such 
a combination of objectives was the RPI-X scheme by Littlechild (1983) that combined 
properties on cost reduction originally developed by Baumol (1982) with properties on 






w ≤  (1+  i  -  X)        (2).   
 
Here, p and q are price and quantity vectors of outputs, and superscripts t refer to time 
period and w to weights. The left-hand side of (2) is a price index. Chained Laspeyres 
weights (q
w = q
t-1) are most common in price cap applications, because they are easily 
calculated and have fairly good economic properties. Idealized weights (q
w = q*) with 
strong efficiency properties would equal perfectly predicted quantities (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1996). The right hand side of (2) determines the price level. ‘i’ is the rate of 
                                                 
10 Sappington and Sibley calculate profits based on expenses rather than costs. As a result, the regulator 
may be asked to finance investments. 
11 Negative fixed fees (= taxing the firm) are problematic, though, because they could induce customers to 
split up their purchases to collect negative fixed fees several times over. 
  9inflation
12 and ‘X’ is the adjustment factor set by the regulator. In a stationary 
environment the price-cap process with chained Laspeyres weights will converge to a 
Ramsey price structure. However, profits will generally be positive at the point of 
convergence. Under idealized weights the Ramsey price structure will be reached in a 
single period. However, the regulator would have to find the weights correctly.  
 
The price-cap approach expressed by equation (2) with Laspeyres weights is actually 







t-1(X - i) ≥  0       ( 2 ’ ) .    
 
The first term on the left hand side is the Slutsky approximation of the change in 
consumer surplus, while the second term can be interpreted as a correction for excess 
profits (if X > i) or insufficient profits (X < i). Now the firm would maximize the 
Lagrangian 
 
Max L =  π(p





t-1(X  -  i)}     (3). 
 
If the constraint is binding λ is positive, meaning that the firm would be maximizing an 
expression that is related to the change in social surplus. It would be a direct 
approximation of the change in social surplus if λ = 1 and if p
t-1q
t-1(X - i) could be 
interpreted as excess profit in the past period.    
 
An alternative to price caps is profit sharing that would, at least in the short run, provide 
softer cost-reducing incentives than price caps. Under profit sharing instead of price caps 
X would be replaced in (2) by sπ
t-1/p
t-1q
t-1, where π is profit and s is the profit share going 
to consumers.
13 The resulting process would, in a stationary environment, converge to 
Ramsey prices under chained Laspeyres weights. Here, profits would also converge to 
zero. The reason for the zero profits is that prices are changed from period to period, as 
long as profits are nonzero (positive or negative). Thus, convergence presupposes zero 
profits. 
      
This short characterization of non-Bayesian incentive schemes suggests that one can 
separate revenue requirement (= price level) from rate design (= price structure). The 
revenue requirement is expressed in the starting value of a price index and in an (RPI – 
X)-type or profit-sharing adjustment. The rate design is expressed in the chosen index 
weights and possible constraints on price restructuring. 
 
There are benefits and risks of granting pricing flexibility to the regulated firm. Some 
flexibility is optimal because of the superior information of the firm on costs and 
demands. The type of flexibility depends on the type of index used to constrain price 
                                                 
12 This would correspond to the change in the retail price index (RPI) in the UK, from which the RPI-X 
formula got its name.  
13 This becomes the mechanism in Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) for s = 1 and i = 0. On a further 
discussion of profit sharing (sliding scale), see Navarro (1996), p. 114 and 136, 138. Navarro in particular 
discusses progressive vs. regressive sharing. 
  10level. Examples include average revenue constraints, chained Laspeyres weights, 
idealized weights, combined Laspeyres/Paasche weights etc. The flexibility of rate design 
can also extend to the introduction of two-part tariffs and more complicated non-linear 
tariffs. Using a two-part tariff, Vogelsang (2001) shows that setting pricing flexibility can 
mean flexibility of investment. Tradeoffs can exist between deviations from marginal-
cost pricing and productive incentives, because the regulated firm may have to be able to 
reap the benefits from cost reduction in the form of prices that exceed costs 
(Schmalensee, 1979). In Vogelsang (2001), however, the productivity incentives are 
captured in the fixed fees. Provided the size of the fixed fee does not affect the number of 
transmission users, allocative efficiency can be achieved over time. 
 
This discussion suggests that, overall, a tradeoff exists for non-Bayesian mechanisms 
between implementability (verifiability at reasonable costs = fulfillment of informational 
and transactional constraints) and achievement of the regulatory objectives (and 
fulfillment of administrative constraints on regulators, e.g., no subsidies or taxes and no 
commitment beyond a certain time horizon). 
 
The non-Bayesian mechanisms tend to be dynamic adjustment processes with some 
optimality properties in the limit, as time goes to infinity, but otherwise only 
improvements over the status quo. However, because of changing environments, 
revisions of the processes are required from time to time. These revisions usually 
coincide with the time limits, beyond which regulators cannot commit anyhow. This 
leads to the question what guidance the non-Bayesian literature can provide on these 
revisions. Beesley and Littlechild (1989) and Crew and Kleindorfer (1996) discuss the 
practical approaches to this problem in the UK and U.S. However, there do not exist 
genuine non-Bayesian regulatory mechanisms for the long run. The only applicable work 
in the theoretical literature seems to be Gilbert and Newbery (1994). They show that rate-
of-return regulation with a “used and useful criterion” can sustain optimal investment. A 
“used and useful” criterion with prudence reviews improves investment incentives by 
avoiding over-capitalization of the Averch-Johnson type. While the non-Bayesian 
incentive mechanisms are designed for allocative and productive efficiency 
improvements in the short run, there does not therefore appear to exist a mechanism for 
long-term improvement over the rate-of-return regulation alternative (with the “used and 
useful” proviso). The results of the Bayesian literature on regulatory commitment could 
provide an explanation for this lack. All that non-Bayesian mechanisms can hope to do in 
this respect is to lengthen the commitment period.   
 
3. Application to transmission pricing 
3.1 Distinguishing features of transmission markets and their 
regulation 
Electricity transmission services are characterized by a number of peculiarities that affect 
the appropriate type of regulation. The peculiarities include very distinct timing issues, a 
superiority of monopoly supply and vertical economies with generation and load-serving 
entities (LSEs).  
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Foremost among and at one extreme of the timing issues is the requirement for real time 
coordination between generation and loads due to the equilibrium requirements of 
transmission networks. At the other extreme of the time scale are long-term investments 
in network facilities, particularly in high-voltage lines, that are sunk and possibly lumpy.   
 
A particularly delicate problem comes from the fact that capacity costs are a transmission 
company’s (Transco’s) paramount cost factor, while the services are largely nonstorable. 
As a result, the Transco faces the problem of optimal capacity expansion and capacity 
utilization. While expansion requires cost coverage and stable signals, utilization requires 
fluctuating prices that follow demands. Prices that preserve long-run investment 
incentives can, for example, be oriented at long-run cost estimates. The long-term 
investments exhibit economies of scale and scope, but loop-flow problems can also cause 
potential diseconomies of scope. Transmission has complicated long-run cost functions 
that are poorly understood at this time. In the short run given capacities associated with 
low operating costs imply as primary short-run costs only line losses and congestion costs 
from capacity constraints. While these short-run costs are not directly incurred by the 
Transco, they need to be imposed upon the transmission users in order to induce them to 
use the transmission network efficiently. Any cost characterization presupposes a 
definition of outputs, which are themselves hard to characterize. We take primary outputs 
to be point-to-point transmission rights, with ancillary services as secondary outputs.  
 
Demand for the primary transmission services is derived from the difference between 
electricity demands by LSEs and supply by generators for all node pairs. Provided an 
input demand is competitive it is usually easily derived from the vertical difference 
between demand downstream and the supply upstream. Due to the point-to-point nature 
of transmission, however, strong demand interactions exist between node pairs. Because 
of the homogeneity of electricity in the network the direct derivation of demand function 
can be complicated. It is hence best to estimate electricity demands at consumption nodes 
and generation supplies at each generation node and find the transmission demand as the 
solution to surplus maximization in the electricity markets between generators and LSEs. 
This mimics perfect competition in market between generators and loads.
14 However, 
transmission demands may not be competitive, due to monopolies of LSEs and market 
power by generators. In this case the derived transmission demand may not be a well-
defined function.
15 The problem of market power on the demand side would probably 
subside if end-user demand for electricity were more price responsive (as a result of 
intelligent metering and pricing) or if electricity purchases by LSEs were covered by 
long-term contracts.   
 
Vertical separation of generation, transmission and distribution is largely the result of 
regulatory reform of the electricity sector. Before the reforms of the 1990s it was 
presumed that vertical economies between these three production stages would dominate 
                                                 
14 The ancillary products are essentially quality variables with public good characteristics. Thus, demands 
for ancillary products are hard to find empirically. 
15 In practice generators with market power may also bid a supply function that could be used for 
estimating transmission demand. 
  12economies from competition under vertical separation. Competition in the electricity 
sector could be feasible under vertical integration of a (formerly) dominant electricity 
provider or under vertical divestiture of this provider. From the regulatory perspective 
these two cases differ in the approach to transmission price regulation. In both cases we 
may view transmission services as a bottleneck input that independent generators and 
LSEs require to trade electricity.
16 For such inputs the access pricing literature is relevant 
(Vogelsang, 2003 for telecommunications). 
 
The access pricing literature differs distinctly between the case of vertical separation and 
that of vertical integration. Under vertical integration a firm would own and operate 
generation, transmission and distribution facilities and would compete with firms that 
only generate or market electricity. Such a (usually dominant) vertically integrated firm 
would, at the same time, supply transmission (and distribution) services as essential 
inputs to its unintegrated rivals. The countervailing interests as a competitor and input 
supplier have to be taken care of in any pricing rule and incentive scheme for such an 
integrated firm. The most relevant schemes in this case are access charges based on 
benchmark costs (TELRIC/TSLRIC
17 in telecommunications, based on analytical cost 
models), the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) and global price caps. Currently, 
vertical integration of this kind has been abolished or is being phased out in the U.S. 
electricity industry. Consequently, we are here concentrating on the case of vertical 
separation.
18 A vertically separated transmission provider could be a single dominant 
transmission company (Transco) or a set of separately owned merchant transmission 
providers. Operation and dispatch would in the latter case require a separate independent 
system operator (ISO), which may also be advantageous in case of a Transco.  
 
Under vertical separation in the form of a Transco the multi-product monopoly regulation 
would be relevant. The Transco would ordinarily have no incentives to deny access to its 
network.
19 However, the Transco may want to charge profit-maximizing monopoly 
prices. In contrast, in the presence of economies of scale welfare-optimal prices would be 
lower in their level but their structure would not necessarily differ from those charged by 
an unregulated monopolist. There would have to be some markups on marginal costs that 
would vary inversely with the demand elasticities (Ramsey prices). If one interprets the 
fixed fee of a two-part tariff as the price for the right to use the transmission network the 
optimal Ramsey markup may be placed totally on this right-to-use, provided the demand 
for it is totally inelastic. In this case marginal cost pricing would become optimal, except 
for the fixed fee. 
 
                                                 
16 Transmission is hard, but not impossible to substitute. Alternatives exist particularly in the long run. 
17 Total Element Long-run Incremental Cost and Total Service Long-Run Incremental Cost. 
18 A more extensive application of the case of vertical integration is contained in Vogelsang (1999). While 
the advantages of vertical integration may be substantial it is not clear that they are preserved if a vertically 
integrated firm is forced to provide unlimited access to its bottleneck facilities. The case of vertical 
integration is highly relevant in the telecommunications sector. See the review of the issues in Vogelsang 
(2003).  
19 Such incentives could exist if incomplete bypass of the transmission network were feasible. Denying 
access to firms that also use bypass facilities could prevent such bypass. 
  133.2 Suggestions for a PBR scheme for transmission pricing 
A limited number of PBR schemes specifically for transmission pricing have been 
suggested in the literature. Among those, we here briefly discuss the merchant 
transmission approach, the Gans/King proposal (based on the ISS), the Léautier proposal 
and my own proposal. 
 
Merchant transmission  
The merchant transmission approach substitutes competition for regulation and is insofar 
outside the PBR proposals. However, merchant transmission has to be viewed as a 
serious substitute for the PBR approach and merchant transmission could benefit from the 
pricing formulas developed for PBR. 
 
Merchant transmission requires separation of transmission ownership and control in order 
to allow for diverse ownership and common management (Joskow and Tirole, 2004). The 
literature shows that free entry by merchant transmission can lead to efficient 
transmission investment and overcome the monopoly problem of constraining capacity, 
provided a number of conditions are met. The main conditions include an absence of 
scale economies and of market power in the electricity wholesale market, the presence of 
well defined property rights to the stream of incremental congestion rents [positive and 
negative] generated by the investment and of sufficient complementary futures markets 
(Hogan, 1992; Bushnell and Stoft (1996, 1997). The planning of merchant transmission 
investments and the award of congestion rents further requires some regulation. Joskow 
and Tirole (2004) show that the efficiency of merchant investment breaks down under 
economies of scale/lumpiness
20 and under imperfect wholesale markets for electricity. 
They also show that gaming may occur between merchant investors and that merchant 
investment does not adapt well to uncertainty and the need for diversification. 
Furthermore, the interaction between expansion and maintenance (network deepening 
investments) is shown to be inefficient. While the Joskow/Tirole analysis is valid, their 
counterfactual is efficient investment behavior. That is a high standard that other 
proposals for monopolistic transmission investments by a Transco may also have a hard 
time to achieve. It will be particularly difficult to design Transco regulation that solves 
the problem of imperfect wholesale markets of electricity. Such regulation would be 
feasible under full information and unlimited transfers. However, if transfers are not 
allowed and if information is asymmetric (and if the relevant information is held by the – 
unregulated – generators) this market power problem can be solved only imperfectly. 
Thus, while merchant transmission may be highly imperfect, open entry into transmission 
investment may be a complementary tool to PBR.   
 
Gans/King  
Gans and King (1999) suggest using the ISS to induce efficient transmission investment. 
They do not formally introduce the ISS but simply note that the ISS would provide the 
                                                 
20 Joskow and Tirole show that in this case under efficient investment the revenues generated by congestion 
rents would be less than the costs of the capacity. One could now use a two-part tariff where the fixed fee 
would capture the remaining surplus form the additional capacity. However, this could lead to gaming in 
merchant investment because the additional surplus is likely to exceed the the trading loss from congestion 
pricing. Under free entry the expectation of positive profits would lead to gaming.     
  14firm with a reward (penalty) equal to the social surplus increase (decrease) in each 
period. The argument is then made through numerical examples. In particular, they claim 
that the ISS would also be capable of alleviating market power by generators efficiently. 
All this is based on the assumption that the relevant information is at the disposal of the 
regulator. Gans and King suggest that this information can be readily inferred by the ISO 
from demand bids and generator bids. Furthermore, they suggest that these bids be used 
to construct counterfactuals without and with the investment. The financing of the ISS 
would then occur through “charging consumers the ‘without-price’ and paying generator 
the ‘with-price’.” The problem with this, as with the following approaches, is the 
question to what extent the short-run bidding behavior can be used as a guide for long-
term investments. A further issue is that investments would be financed fully from fixed 
fees at the time the expenses occur. This could lead to extraordinarily high fixed fees, 
when new lines would be added.  
 
Léautier/Nasser  
Léautier (2000) proposes a regulatory contract that is closely related to the Gans/King 
proposal except that it is based in the Bayesian tradition. Léautier assumes that the 
incentive-pricing dichotomy holds so that pricing incentives can be separated from 
incentives for cost reductions. He then suggests offering the Transco a menu of revenue-
sharing rules that trade off cost reductions against providing rents for the firm. There is 
no discussion of the practical implementation and financing of this part of the 
mechanism. Optimal transmission expansion is taken care of in the second part of the 
mechanism, according to which the Transco is “responsible for the full cost of the 
[operational] out-turn, plus the transmission losses, valued at the System Marginal Price.” 
(Léautier, 2000, p. 77) The operational out-turn is “the sum over all generation nodes of 
the integral of the marginal generation cost minus the ‘unconstrained’ price, where the 
integral is taken between the constrained and ‘unconstrained’ generation.” (p. 72) The 
operational out-turn is thus a measure of the cost of congestion to society. If the Transco 
is made to pay for all these losses it will minimize the sum of costs of transmission 
investment, transmission losses and social cost of congestion and will thereby be induced 
to invest efficiently. Calculation of the operational out-turn is similar to that of the 
surplus change under the ISS proposed by Gans and King. In Nasser (1997, pp. 206-209) 
Léautier also proposes a non-Bayesian scheme related to Finsinger and Vogelsang 
(1982). In this case, instead of any other revenues (that go to the regulator) the Transco, 
in each period t, receives a subsidy equal to the investment payment plus a fraction of the 
“net corrected revenue.” Here the net corrected revenue is the sum of two components. 
The first is the sum of the value of flowgate rights multiplied by the net change in line 
capacity between t-1 and in t.
21 This component can be interpreted as the Slutsky 
approximation of the consumer surplus change from the capacity expansion. The second 
component is a fraction of the variable costs of investment in period t. In a stationary 
environment, this scheme would (like Vogelsang (2001) below) converge to optimal 
capacities over time. The problem of the Léautier/Nasser proposals is, however, that they 
are silent about how the costs borne by the Transco will be financed by the regulator.      
 
                                                 
21 Flowgate rights relate to individual lines and their use for point-to-point transmission. The value of a 
flowgate right corresponds to the shadow price of a line. 
  15 
Vogelsang and Rosellón/Vogelsang 
While the Gans/King and Léautier/Nasser proposals explicitly calculate the optimal 
regulatory scheme for each transmission investment, the proposal by Vogelsang (2001) is 
based on the price-cap tradition. Under Vogelsang (2001) the sequence of moves would 
be 
(1) The regulator sets the regulatory pricing constraint (given by equation 7 below). 
(2) The Transco collects information about generation supply and electricity demand 
at all relevant geographical locations (or at each node). 
(3) The Transco invests in grid capacity. 
(4) The Transco sets point-to-point transmission prices. 
(5) Generators and loads sign bilateral electricity contracts and buy point-to-point 
transmission services. 
(6) There can be excess supply or excess demand for transmission services on a 
point-to-point basis. Excess supply could hurt the Transco but would not cause 
any feasibility problems. Excess demand could cause feasibility problems 
(although, together with excess supply for other point-to-point relationships the 
total sum might still be feasible). The Transco could then use non-price rationing 
and sell point-to-point transmission services to bilaterals on a first-come-first-
serve basis. Regulators could impose penalties, giving the Transco incentives to 
price in such a way that excess demand does not occur (creating excess supply). 
(7) The Transco calculates the fixed fee from the regulatory constraint and charges it 
to the loads. 
 
Alternatively, moves (4)-(7) could be replaced by:  
 
(4a) There is an ISO, who asks for (sequences of) bids from generators and loads at 
each node and then calculates nodal prices. Loads (ex post) pay the ISO according to 
their last bids and generators receive payment of their last bids in such a way that 
markets always clear. The Transco receives as congestion payments the difference 
between what loads pay and what generators receive. Fixed fees are then calculated 
from the regulatory constraint and are paid by the loads. In this case the Transco does 
not set prices but only makes available capacities.  
 
Vogelsang (2001, in the formulation of Rosellón and Vogelsang, 2004) assume that, for a 
load-flow model for real power (DC load approximation), the Transco’s profit 
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If the weights of the price-cap mechanism are chained Laspeyres weights, if the 
transmission cost function is well-behaved, if the environment does not change and if 
transmission capacity can be adapted in every period the mechanism converges to 
transmission capacity and prices that are surplus maximizing.
22 With idealized weights 
the mechanism converges in a single period. Because of a changing environment and 
because transmission investments are likely to be lumpy, an approximation of idealized 
weights would therefore be crucial for the mechanism to become practically relevant.  
 
It is challenging to regulate fluctuating prices while keeping the long-run incentives. 
Price caps can be used for that purpose because they provide stable price levels along 
with flexibility of the price structure. As shown in Vogelsang (2001) such combination 
can be achieved in price caps with two-part tariffs, where the fixed part compensates for 
variations in the variable parts. Then both good capacity expansion and capacity 
utilization properties are achievable. Vogelsang (2001) is the only mechanism so far that 
directly links real-time pricing with investments. However, Vogelsang shows that in the 
case of real-time pricing an ISO would be required to ensure that those prices truly reflect 
the network scarcity at any point in time. Otherwise, the Transco would have incentives 
to distort real-time pricing under the mechanism. 
 
Conclusions from the literature 
The suggestions made in the literature so far are not well adapted to the length of life of 
transmission investments and the environmental changes associated with that length. The 
Gans/King and Léautier proposals both base the investment incentives on the bid curves 
of generators and loads but do not specify the periods of observation and how the 
regulator would aggregate this information into a forecast that would be relevant for 
long-term investment. The Vogelsang proposal shifts this problem from the regulator to 
                                                 
22 In principle, this pricing mechanism can be extended to merchant investors, who each would receive 
fixed fees with precisely the same property. 
  17the Transco that is made responsible for forecasting correctly. However, neither of the 
approaches deals with the credibility of the regulator in the long run.     
  
3.3 A synthesis approach based on a three-period framework 
In my view, the main problem with the PBR schemes for transmission proposed in the 
literature is their failure to come to grips with the specific timing issues of transmission 
services and networks. We therefore explicitly introduce a framework based on those 
timing issues. This framework is based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and 
long periods. 
 
3.3.1 The framework 
The ultra-short period  
The ultra-short period is motivated by the desirability of real time pricing, which is a 
distinct and differentiating feature of transmission pricing. Real-time pricing could also 
be substituted by peak-load pricing.
23 During the ultra-short period the Transco (or ISO) 
makes dispatch decisions only (incl. demand curtailment) and there are no meaningful 
possibilities for transmission cost reductions. Thus, this is only an allocative efficiency 
problem. Pricing occurs largely under certainty about supply and demand. Demands for 
transmission services will fluctuate wildly between ultra-short periods. The demand 
elasticity for transmission services will be determined mostly by electricity supply 
because electricity demand is very inelastic in the very short run. Regarding PBR, full 
regulatory commitment can be expected. Steep incentives would be adequate because the 
relevant activity does not extend beyond the period of commitment and the information is 
also not valid beyond.  
 
The short period  
The short period coincides in terms of pricing with the application of RPI-X or profit 
sharing for each of these periods. It is also the period for calculation of fixed fees.
24 
During such a short period decisions are made on operations, repairs and maintenance. 
The ability of the Transco to influence costs can be limited during this period. Thus, 
allocative efficiency would be most important, but productive efficiency can also play a 
role. Pricing occurs under some market uncertainty. Demands for transmission services 
will be more elastic than in the ultra-short periods because there will be some adjustments 
by electricity customers in the use of appliances. For each of these short periods 
regulatory commitment is complete, and there is almost full regulatory commitment over 
several of them. For activities restricted to this period and with parallel myopic 
information steep incentives are in order.  
 
The long period  
                                                 
23 The advantages and disadvantages of real-time pricing vs. peak-load pricing are reminiscent of those 
between point-to-point vs. zonal pricing. 
24 If fixed fees and RPI-X apply to different period lengths (e.g., month vs. year) the short period could 
actually be disaggregated further. This could play a role if the mechanism used does not converge in a 
single period. 
  18In terms of pricing the long period is given by the time between revisions of the PBR 
mechanism applied. It would, for example, apply to a change in RPI-X formula. The long 
period could coincide with the length of the regulatory contract. This period typically 
lasts 3-5 years and is too short to cover network investment decisions, which extend over 
several such periods (time to build plus life of asset plus life of overlapping assets). Also, 
the time for the validity of information about investment is likely to be similarly long. 
Thus, the motivation for the length of this period is not given by the time horizon of 
investment but rather by the ability to commit, given external changes over time. PBR 
regulation is often seen as applicable only in the short run. If regulatory commitment to a 
PBR cannot be guaranteed beyond a single long period and if investments last over 
several or many of such periods, how can PBR aid investment? Does the failure of 
commitment mean that PBR also would not work during each long period if there were 
more than one? We interpret the absence of regulatory commitment to a PBR mechanism 
not to be the absence of any commitment. Rather, it means the absence of commitment 
beyond some basic rules (such as the restrictions implied by the 1944 Hope decision of 
the US Supreme Court).
25 These basic rules are implementable because they are based on 
the U.S. Constitution and on fairness principles. As indicated above, rate-of-return 
regulation with a “used and useful” criterion could be the basis for PBR revisions after 
long periods. The interaction of competition (merchant investment) and dominant firm 
regulation could also play a role for the long-term revisions. As the Transco can 
definitely influence its costs during the period and over several of such periods, 
incentives for cost reductions would be desirable. However, all one can hope for is (a) 
that the period between reviews can be extended sufficiently (with commitment) under 
flexible PBR that traces the firm’s costs well enough to mimic the outcome of rate-of-
return regulation during that time, (b) commitment can be sustained longer than a single 
long period under repeated interaction, with regulatory reputation at stake and new 
investments required in a growing market. Between long periods the demands for 
transmission services will also be affected by location decisions of electricity generators. 
The interaction between such generation investments and transmission investments 




Performance-based regulation has increased pricing flexibility in some areas and thereby 
been conducive to liberalization if only as a concession to make incumbents willing to 
accept sector reforms. The impact of amending or replacing rate-of-return regulation by 
incentive regulation (price caps) increases short-term efficiency incentives. However, 
rate-of-return regulation had been a commitment device against expropriation and 
therefore has shielded sunk, lumpy investments (Newbery, 2000). The 1970s and 1980s 
showed that this device no longer worked. Rate-of-return regulation prevented innovative 
investment and was associated with the nuclear cost overruns. Its further problem is that 
it is not compatible with competition because it reduces the incumbent’s cost-reducing 
incentives and its pricing flexibility. Thus, regulation has to combine flexibility of PBR 
with assurances of rate-of-return regulation. 
 
                                                 
25 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co. , 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
  19While the range between the ultra-short periods and a single long period is linked by 
credible commitment, the long periods themselves are not. The Bayesian literature would 
therefore suggest that the incentives within a short period might have to be softened, 
compared to a regulatory problem that would consist of only a single long period. 
However, this depends on (a) the types of decisions to be made and the knowledge gained 
by the regulator during the types of periods and (b) the consequences of lack of 
commitment.  
 
Clearly, network expansion investments carry over several long periods so that for them 
the lack of commitment would be relevant. The question, however, is if information from 
spot pricing and from short-term O&M decisions carries over beyond a single long 
period. I conjecture that it does. For example, the spot-price information can and will be 
used to inform the network expansion and maintenance decisions. Similarly, the 
maintenance information will be used for investment decisions and for future 
maintenance decisions. Also, maintenance decisions influence the replacement 
investments. Thus, while the informational link between ultra-short, short and long 
periods may not be as strong as the links in the shorter run, it is still existent and 
potentially relevant for incentives. This suggests that profit sharing may be preferable to a 
strict RPI-X regime for the link between the short periods. Nevertheless, previous 
experience with profit sharing that broke down under inflation suggests that the RPI-X 
formula should be combined with profit sharing. 
 
The important question is therefore, what is the meaning of the non-commitment beyond 
a single long period. This non-commitment could mean something very different in the 
U.S. than in other countries without the rate-of-return regulation tradition.
26 In the U.S. it 
means that regulated firms can only expect a competitive rate of return on their 
investments and that they can expect such a return only if their investments are found to 
be prudent (“used and useful”). At the same time, they cannot expect to receive a higher 
rate of return. In my view, this introduces a potential bias that is contrary to the 
assumption of the Bayesian literature (and more in line with Joskow, 1974). Under the 
Bayesian incentive regulation approach with lack of commitment, the firm is expected to 
be penalized by a downward price adjustment if it does well (has low costs). In contrast, 
under U.S. style rate-of-return regulation the regulated firm would be penalized if it does 
badly (overestimates demands and/or underestimates costs). Whether this potential 
penalty is responsible for the observation that allowed rates of return are on average 
higher than the cost of capital is an open question. What does this imply for short-term 
incentive schemes in combination with rate-of-return regulation? Provided rate-of-return 
regulation is upheld in the long run, it implies that the firm can expect to have part of any 
gain (or loss) from short-term incentives in excess of the allowed rate of return be taken 
away ex nunc, after a long-term regulatory review.
27 The effect of this will depend on the 
extent of achievable gains relative to the overall rate of return of the firm. 
 
Thus, while rate-of-return regulation provides for some commitment, even over several 
or even many long periods, the question is if there can be other long-run regulatory 
                                                 
26 For this issue of country-specific institutional endowments, see Levy and Spiller (1996). 
27 To the best of my knowledge no important court decisions have been made to the contrary. 
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expect that the types of regulatory constraint, such as real-time pricing with two-part 
tariffs (with adjustments to the fixed fees) or the RPI-X formula (with adjustments of the 
X-factor), will remain in the long run? That is obviously not the case. As a result 
regulated firms will not make optimal investments in their full adaptation to the features 
of the mechanism.               
 
3.3.2 The approach to each type of period 
I am going to base the arguments in the following on Vogelsang (2001). Recall that in 
that mechanism investment (and disinvestment) occurred at the beginning of each period, 
followed by variable pricing that would coincide with actual transmission, while fixed 
fees would be calculated at the end of the period. Thus, the mechanism lumps together 
the short period and the long period and assumes that investments do not extend beyond a 
single such period. In Rosellón and Vogelsang (2004) we try to make investments last 
beyond single periods and do not allow for disinvestments. However, the three-types-of-
period approach outlined in the last section goes substantially beyond that. Under the 
three-types-of-period approach, no investment might occur for many short periods and 
even for times beyond a long period. The influence of the mechanism on investment 
would only occur via the long-run rate-of-return constraint in conjunction with price 
predictions from the operations of the mechanism in the past.   
 
The ultra-short period 
Since the ultra-short period is only concerned with pricing and since there is full 
commitment, a fully efficient mechanism can be used if available. In Vogelsang (2001) I 
argue that real-time pricing is not compatible with an index approach to price regulation. 
Thus, if one wants to use price caps based on a price index, peak-load pricing with 
identifiable ultra-short periods would be required. In contrast, real-time pricing would 
work only under average revenue (AR) constraints, where for each point-to-point 
transmission service the total revenues from real-time pricing would be summed over all 
ultra-short periods in a short period and then divided by the number of ultra-short 
periods. Because such AR constraints would be soft on a Transco’s pricing, this approach 
may require the aid of an ISO, who makes sure that the real-time prices are the actual 
congestion prices. Real-time congestion pricing would be optimal but not cost covering if 
there are economies of scale or stranded costs that need coverage. This would either 
suggest cost coverage through a not fully efficient peak-load pricing mechanism or 
eliminating the deficit from congestion pricing by charging a fixed fee. Such fixed fees 
would only be calculated and billed over longer periods, linking the ultra-short period 
with the short period. 
 
The short period 
Pricing in the short period is characterized by the collection of the fixed fee and by some 
adjustment according to formula. This adjustment could be of the RPI-X type, the 
benchmark (= yardstick) or the profit-sharing type with an inflation adjustment. In either 
case, the expectation is that the regulated firm, if operating efficiently, can at least cover 
its costs and can possibly do better. This period therefore requires regulatory commitment 
  21for several such periods. As a result, prices can be allocatively efficient, while incentives 
for short- to medium-term managerial and operating efficiency are provided.
28
 
The long period 
Regulatory commitment is assumed not to last beyond a long period, which covers 
several short periods. At the same time, network (expansion) investments last over 
several long periods. The Bayesian literature therefore suggests that investment-inducing 
incentives should be kept low-powered, such as under rate-of-return regulation. At the 
same time, the literature on rate-of-return regulation has gone beyond the Averch-
Johnson effect by including the “used and useful” criterion as a means of inducing 
efficient investment levels. Thus, we revert to this device for the long-run revisions of the 
PBR.  
 
This would be relevant for the starting prices under PBR. Such prices should definitely 
cover forward-looking costs. However, they may also have to contain a surcharge on 
forward-looking costs to finance stranded assets (defined as the amount by which 
bookkeeping values of assets exceed their economic value). Often, at the beginning of 
PBR the starting prices can be taken to be those under cost-of-service regulation and any 
adjustment to the desired level would be achieved through the X-factor or profit sharing. 
 
When it comes to revisions at the end of a long period, a one-time adjustment can be 
made to reach prices that cover forward-looking costs (assuming that stranded costs have 
vanished over time) or the X-factor (or increased profit sharing) can be used to get there 
gradually. Further adjustments can be made for the consequences of lumpy investments. 
Because of the “used and useful” criterion those investment costs would not prudently be 
added on a forward-looking basis (which would otherwise be economically correct) but 
only when used. Since under PBR for a Transco all these investment costs would be 
covered by adjustments of the fixed fees, the allocative distortions from such a 
postponement of cost reimbursement (including interest) would be minimal.    
 
A combined approach for all types of periods 
A combined approach could be based on a blend between Vogelsang (2001) and the ISS 
with a verifiable approximation of consumer surplus change and financing of the 
‘subsidy’ through the fixed fee of a two-part tariff. Recall that under the approximated 







t-1        ( 8 )  
 
Here πt-1 is the profit (excess rate of return over cost of capital) generated last period from 
the nodal prices only. The representative element of any price vector p
t is p
t




ijτ, where subscripts ij refer to nodes i and j, while τ refers to the 
relevant ultra-short sub-period of period t. Sappington and Sibley show that pricing 
converges in a single period to the efficient level and stays there, provided cost and 
                                                 
28 The incentives obviously lessen toward the end of each long period. In principle, the regulator can deal 
with this problem through appropriate time-specific weighting. See Vogelsang (1989). 
  22demand parameters do not change.
29 It is easy to show that this extends to Transco 
investment. In particular, the Transco would receive a total economic profit for any 
period in which it improves efficiency by investment (in expansion). The profit would 
equal the efficiency increase. In each period after that the firm would be reimbursed any 
losses incurred under nodal prices. This means that the fixed fees thereafter (in periods 
without transmission expansion) simply assure that the firm covers all its costs after 
deficits from nodal prices. 
 
In contrast to (8) under Vogelsang (2001) the regulatory constraint with the 








t-1)         ( 9 )  
 
There are two main differences between (8) and (9). First, (9) provides for cumulative 
consumer surplus increases to the Transco. Second, in (8) last period’s profit is deducted. 
Now, we can combine the two mechanisms by using (9) for pricing in the ultra-short and 
short periods,
30 an RPI-X adjustment or profit sharing for the short periods and a profit 
adjustment (by total excess profits rather than excess profits from nodal prices only) at 
the end of each long period. This means that prices p
t would be average revenues from 








t-1N[1 + i – X] + ½(p
t-1[1 + i – X] - p
t)(q
t + q
t-1), t = 1,...,T      (10) 
 
T is the number of short periods that would form the basis for an overall profit 
adjustment. Although the RPI-X (or profit sharing) adjustments apply to both F and p 
they would only change the fixed fees and have no effects on efficient variable prices. 
These adjustments would, however, partially counteract any consumer surplus increases 
that are handed to the Transco cumulatively. If this interplay is anticipated well by the 
regulator’s choice of X and/or the profit-sharing parameter s the long period of 
commitment could be extended somewhat. Biglaiser and Riordan (2000) show that if the 
long period between price cap reviews is too short then this can lead to underinvestment. 
Thus, extending this period is likely to be beneficial (although, according to Biglaiser and 
Riordan, the period can also be too long).  
 
A potential problem with any lagged mechanism is that the underlying cost and demand 
functions shift over time. While cost shifts between long periods are captured by the 
factors i and X, demand shifts would have to be covered either in the overall profit 
adjustment at the end of each long period, or a demand growth factor ‘g’ would have to 
be added in each short period, so that the multiplicative factor would read [1 + i  - X + g].     
  
 
                                                 
29 However, it is not clear how the properties extend to (a) the general multiproduct cases with 
interdependent demands and (b) shifts in demands. 
30 For the combination of short and ultra-short periods see Vogelsang (2001), pp. 155-160. 
  234. Conclusions and open research questions 
4.1 Conclusions 
Economists like to optimize. Performance-based regulation (PBR) should be optimal. 
What does that mean? Until about 1970, many of us believed in truly optimal or first best 
regulation, which meant marginal cost prices. However, over time, the adjective 
"optimal" has received more and more qualifications (Vogelsang, 1999). The first was 
that losses incurred under optimal prices in the presence of economies of scale led to 
second best Ramsey pricing, a movement that peaked around 1980. The main insight here 
was that prices should deviate from marginal cost prices by markups that are inversely 
proportional to demand elasticities (or, more precisely, to super-elasticities). The 
deficiency of Ramsey prices was the regulator's lack of information about cost and 
demand functions. Thus, the next wave was third best regulation under incomplete 
information. The main insights from this wave were (a) that regulated firms might need 
to be able to make economic profits in order to reveal private information and (b) that 
such profits can be limited by giving firms a choice from a menu of regulatory options. 
This wave probably peaked with the publication of the Laffont and Tirole (1993) book on 
incentive regulation. What is the next step away from optimal price regulation? Is it 
fourth best regulation that makes theoretical models of regulation applicable under 
political and practicality constraints? In any case, regulation economists have moved 
further and further away from what was once perceived as optimal price regulation. 
Consequently, in order to be relevant, the price regulation mechanisms we consider here 
are not strictly optimal in that they maximize a well-defined social welfare function. 
Rather, the PBR schemes are meant for practical application and thus should have some 
desirable properties. 
 
A specific list of such objectives for electricity transmission pricing has been developed 
by Green (1997). According to him transmission pricing should fulfill six sensible 
principles. They are 
1.  Efficient day-to-day operation of the bulk power market 
2.  Efficient investment in the transmission system 
3.  Signaling of locational advantages for generation and distribution investments 
4.  (Historic) cost recovery of transmission assets 
5.  Simplicity and transparency 
6.  Political feasibility. 
 
Among Green’s (1997) principles for transmission performance we have concentrated 
our discussion on the functioning of the bulk power market, on cost recovery and on 
transmission investment.  
 
Principles 1 (a functioning bulk power market) and 2 (transmission investments) would 
be assured under our mechanism, provided the generators have no market power. To the 
extent that the transmission users have market power transmission pricing may need to 
counteract this downstream market power by pricing below marginal costs. This would 
compensate for but does not necessarily eliminate that market power. It would be 
associated by larger transmission capacity. 
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In order to achieve principle 3 (optimal location of generation capacity), the Transco 
would either have to set predictable variable fees and fixed fees that directly relate to 
transmission capacity costs caused by new generation/distribution capacity or would have 
to engage in long-term contracting with its customers. Both of these are feasible under 
the proposed scheme but not automatic parts of it. The suggested regulatory approach is 
definitely compatible with stable average prices incurred by customers that would signal 
transmission investment costs. In addition, the approach can also be implemented through 
contracts (as options or as part of tariffs). For example, customers could buy interruptible 
service at lower fixed fees or firm services at higher fixed fees (and, possibly lower or 
vanishing variable fees). All this could be done within the price-cap constraint. However, 
since transmission users would have to pay fixed fees that are independent of their 
individual usage and since most of these users would remain transmission users 
independent of their generation investments, potential generation investors would only be 
able to use the variable transmission prices as signals for their generation investments. 
This could lead to insufficient generation investments that would be substitutes for 
transmission capacity.   
 
Principle 4 (cost recovery) can be achieved through initial rates that reflect embedded 
investment costs. In this case, the 'X' factor or profit sharing would have to account for 
the difference between embedded average costs and forward-looking incremental costs. If 
embedded average costs exceed forward looking incremental costs 'X' or the profit share 
going to consumers should be positive, inducing lower prices and forcing the firm to 
reduce its costs through investment. Vice versa, if embedded average costs are below 
forward-looking incremental costs, 'X' or the “profit” share going to consumers should be 
negative and induce higher prices. In the long run, adjustments according to rate-of-return 
regulation with a “used and useful” criterion would assure cost recovery.  
 
Principle 5 (simplicity and transparency) is in the eyes of the beholder. Clearly, the 
regulatory mechanism has to be based on transparent data. The level of complexity of 
actual tariffs depends on the tradeoff between efficiency and complexity that market 
participants and regulators are willing to make. Since participants in the transmission 
market are largely sophisticated firms, simplicity would have less value here than in the 
retail market for electricity. 
 
Principle 6 (political feasibility) requires that no interest group involved is made 
noticeably worse off. It is closely linked with principles 4 and 5. Principle 4 assures that 
the Transco is not made worse off. In addition, basing initial rates on historic costs and 
choosing 'X' carefully assures that generators, industrial users and distribution companies 
receive services on average at better than status-quo prices. However, that does not 
necessarily mean that all of them are better off. First, better transmission can intensify 
competition between generators, thus reducing profits of some of them. Second, more 
sophisticated pricing means that former cross-subsidies may be eliminated. Thus, 
political opposition would have to be overcome.   
 
  254.2 Open research questions 
Several aspects of the types of PBR discussed above require further research. 
 
While the regulator and Transco may gather valuable information about the profitability 
of transmission investments from the short-term bids of generators and load-serving 
entities or from the fluctuation in congestion prices, it is not obvious how this short-term 
information translates into projections necessary for long-term investments. Obviously, 
long-term demands for transmission services depend on lumpy investments by generators 
and loads and potentially on changes in consumption behavior induced by improved 
consumption metering and smart scheduling of appliances. It would be highly valuable to 
generate such long-term information. 
 
A related research question is how long the half-life of information is that the regulator 
gains from the revealed behavior of the Transco. The shorter this half-life is, the less 
would a lack of regulatory commitment matter. This half-life may vary for different 
activities, such as the costs of expansion investments (where it may be very long) as 
opposed to the costs of operations and maintenance (where it may be much shorter). 
 
Ever since the California electricity disaster the market power of generators has become a 
major regulatory nightmare in states that have reformed their electricity sectors. Increased 
transmission capacity has been suggested as a means of reducing such market power. It 
would therefore be important to research the effects of PBR for Transco investments and 
their interaction with (a) generation investments and (b) short-term generator behavior. 
 
We have used a linear approximation to the consumer surplus change in equations (8) and 
(9) above. If the approximation is (almost) correct it would provide full and immediate 
incentives for efficient investment levels. However, it is not clear that the approximation 
is correct if (a) demands for the different point-to-point transmission services are 
interdependent and if (b) demands shift over time. Demand interdependence in 
transmission systems is very likely. However, it may be symmetric so that the 
integrability conditions for the demand system hold. We will try to determine if those 
conditions are sufficient for the approximation to be correct. Exogenous demand shifts 
would definitely bias the approximation because part of the quantity changes would be 
due to demand shifts rather than to price changes. Thus, the approximation would have to 
be adjusted for such demand shifts. We will try to find ways to make such adjustments.  
 
Fixed fees are usually a good way to raise revenues without generating severe allocative 
distortions. However, if most of the revenues are generated from fixed fees, users may 
want to avoid such fees and fairness questions arise if small or intermittent users have to 
pay the same fixed fees as large continuous users. Vogelsang (2001) discusses some 
methods for calculating fixed fees in a more discriminating fashion. However, the best 
basis for fixed fees has yet to be determined. This could also take care of the issue of 
demand shifts. 
 
We have not considered quality aspects, reliability in particular. Our incentive regulation 
proposal relies largely on the Transco's profit incentive to provide quality of service. Bad 
  26quality in the form of congestion, for example, would either lead to high variable fees 
that would be penalized through lower fixed fees. Or it would lead to foregone sales. 
However, the price-cap scheme may not take care of all quality dimensions and, to the 
extent that price caps constrain profits, there may exist incentives to reduce costs by 
reducing some quality attributes. To prevent this, quality incentives, standards and 
commitments may need to be added to the regulatory scheme, for example, in order to 
prevent poor ancillary services and outages. Quality parameters that may require attention 
include system reliability, customer service or employee safety. The problem of valuing 
quality poses a big problem for the implementation of PBR.
31
 
We have discussed merchant entry only as an alternative to PBR of Transcos. However, 
allowing merchant entry may also be a complementary instrument. Allowing entry is 
usually a credible long-term commitment because entrants quickly form a strong interest 
group countervailing the political clout of the incumbent. Merchant entry may therefore 
act as a lid to incumbent inefficiency in investment. However, the question is if there 
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